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In the 1980s and '90s, Congress passed a series of highway laws
providing states with federal funds to augment state highway pro-jects-but with "strings attached."' Under these laws, states only re-
ceive federal funds if they agree to implement congressionally de-
signed affirmative action programs on state highway projects using
federal funds.' These laws accomplish Congress's goal of promoting
minority participation in state highway projects but leave states the
responsibility of enacting and implementing the specific affirmative
action programs.
Congress's authority to place conditions on federal funds stems
from its constitutionally based Spending Power. Normally, Congress
passes laws that are directly implemented by the federal government.
t B.G.S. 2004, University of Michigan; J.D. Candidate 2007, The University of Chicago.
1 See Milwaukee County Pavers Association v Fiedler, 922 F2d 419, 422 (7th Cir 1991)
(noting that the statute in question required that a specific percentage of the funds appropriated
be expended on a defined group of businesses). For the highway laws, see, for example, Transpor-
tation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21), Pub L No 105-178 § 1101(b), 112 Stat 107, 113(1998), codified at 23 USC § 101 note (2000); Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act
of 1991, Pub L No 102-240 § 1003(b), 105 Stat 1914, 1919-21 (1991), codified at 23 USC § 101
note (2000); Surface Transportation and Uniform Relocation Assistance Act of 1987, Pub L No
100-17 § 106(c), 101 Stat 132, 145-46 (1987), codified at 23 USC § 101 note (2000); Surface Trans-
portation Assistance Act of 1982, Pub L No 97-424 § 105(f), 96 Stat 2097,2100 (1982), codified at
23 USC § 101 note (2000).
2 See Milwaukee Pavers, 922 F2d at 423 ("The receipt of funds under the federal Act is volun-
tary, but a state that decides to receive such funds is bound by the [affirmative action] regulations").
3 It is worth noting that each of the series of laws passed by Congress has slightly different
requirements and provides states with different degrees of leeway. Ultimately, however, the
actual contours of such programs do not contribute significantly to the circuit split, which is
couched at a more general level.
4 US Const Art I, § 8, cl 1 ("The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Du-
ties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general
Welfare of the United State&s"). Implicit in this enumerated power is Congress's authority to
spend. See South Dakota v Dole, 483 US 203,207 (1987).
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By contrast, the Spending Power allows Congress to achieve its policy
goals indirectly, using federal funds to incentivize state action
Under the highway laws in question, states choosing to accept the
federal funds agree to enact a law implementing an affirmative action6
program on every state highway project funded with federal monies.
Subcontractors whose bids were rejected on such projects in favor of
minority-owned businesses challenged the implementing laws as un-
constitutional under two theories. First, subcontractors brought facial
challenges against the federal laws as violations of the equal protec-
tion component of the Fifth Amendment Federal courts of appeals
considering these challenges agreed that the federal laws are facially
constitutional.8 Second, subcontractors also brought as-applied chal-
lenges against individual states' implementation of the federal condi-
tions as violations of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.9 These same circuits have split over whether states are
susceptible to as-applied constitutional challenges for implementing
federal affirmative action laws."
This Comment resolves the circuit split through a novel approach,
arguing that understanding a state's role in implementing federal con-
ditions is essential to analyzing the split. A state is subject to the limi-
tations of the Fourteenth Amendment when it creates and applies an
5 See id (noting that when Congress legislates indirectly with its Spending Power it provides
recipients with "a choice: Either [accept the statutory conditions] or forgo certain federal funds").
6 See, for example, Western States Paving Co, Inc v Washington State Department of Trans-
portation, 407 F3d 983, 987 (9th Cir 2005). The state of Washington adopted a federally designed
affirmative action program in order to receive federal funds under TEA-21 and subsequently
used those funds for the "NE Burton Road Project." The state required 14 percent minority
participation on this project and rejected the bid of the plaintiff subcontractor although it was
$100,000 lower than that of the minority-owned subcontractor.
7 Today it is widely accepted that the Fifth Amendment contains an equal protection
component equivalent to the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. See Adarand
Constructors, Inc v Pena, 515 US 200,217 (1995).
8 See Western States, 407 F3d at 993-95 (finding that "Congress had a strong basis in evi-
dence for concluding that ... discrimination within the transportation contracting industry hin-
ders minorities' ability to compete for federally funded contracts" and that the program at issue
was narrowly tailored to meet these objectives); Sherbrooke Turf, Inc v Minnesota Department of
Transportation, 345 F3d 964, 969-73 (8th Cir 2003) (same); Adarand Constructors, Inc v Slater,
228 F3d 1147, 1164-87 (10th Cir 2000) (same). See also Tennessee Asphalt Co v Farris, 942 F2d
969,972 (6th Cir 1991) ("In this appeal the plaintiffs concede the facial validity of section 105(f)
and the regulations, and limit their constitutional challenge to [the Tennessee Department of
Transportation's] program as applied."); Milwaukee Pavers, 922 F2d at 423 (noting that the con-
tractors "challenge the Act neither on its face nor as applied" and generally agreeing that the
statute was immune from facial challenge).
9 US Const Amend XIV, § 1 ("[Nlor shall any state ... deny to any person within its juris-
diction the equal protection of the laws.").
10 Compare Western States, 407 F3d at 996 (allowing as-applied challenges); Sherbrooke
Turf, 345 F3d at 973 (same), with Tennessee Asphalt, 942 F2d at 975 (rejecting such challenges);
Milwaukee Pavers, 922 F2d at 423 (same).
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affirmative action law." If not barred by sovereign immunity,'2 a plain-
tiff may challenge a state-created affirmative action law as a violation
of the Equal Protection Clause. Here, however, a state is not the origi-
nal source of the affirmative action laws. Instead, a state is implement-
ing the federal government's program. Thus, the question remains
whether a state is immunized from all Fourteenth Amendment chal-
lenges when implementing an affirmative action law pursuant to a
federal funding requirement."
This Comment answers this question in the negative, arguing that
a state's constitutional role requires its susceptibility to challenge.
Four justifications support this position: (1) the Supreme Court's dic-
tum that a state is susceptible to challenge when applying a Spending
Power law; (2) the seemingly settled rule that enforcement of a law by
a state is sufficient to trigger the Fourteenth Amendment's limitations;
(3) the absurd consequences of not holding states susceptible to chal-
lenge; and (4) a state's sovereign role under the Spending Power.
Part I examines the current state of Spending Power law, the con-
stitutional power under which these affirmative action statutes are
passed. Part II analyzes the current circuit split. Part III evaluates the
divergent holdings of the circuits, ultimately rejecting both positions
as unpersuasive. Part IV offers four justifications for determining that
a state must be susceptible to an as-applied constitutional challenge
when it applies federal affirmative action law.
II See Grutter v Bollinger, 539 US 306 (2003) (considering whether the affirmative action
plan of a state institution-the University of Michigan-met the limitations of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause); Adarand, 515 US at 227 ("[W]e hold today that all racial classifications, imposed by
whatever federal, state, or local governmental actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court
under strict scrutiny.").
12 See US Const Amend XI ("The Judicial power of the United States shall not be con-
strued to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."); Hans v
Lousiana, 134 US 1, 14-16 (1890) (applying the same rule when a citizen sues her own state). See
also Ex parte Young, 209 US 123, 144-45 (1908) (allowing one to sue a state official for a state's
purportedly unconstitutional action); Edelman v Jordan, 415 US 651,664-67 (1974) (limiting Ex
parte Young to suits for prospective injunctive relief).
13 See, for example, Milwaukee Pavers, 922 F2d at 421 ("In the first type of program the
state is the principal, rather than an agent of federal highway authorities, because the state re-
ceives no money from the federal government .... In the second type of program the state is the
administrator and disbursing agent of federal highway grants.").
14 Compare id at 423 ("If the state does exactly what the statute expects it to do, and the
statute is conceded for purposes of the litigation to be constitutional, we do not see how the state
can be thought to have violated the Constitution."), with Sherbrooke Turf, 345 F3d at 969-74 (ap-
plying strict scrutiny analysis to the plaintiffs' as-applied challenges because "[t]hough [the statute]
confers benefits on 'socially and economically disadvantaged individuals,' a term that is facially
race-neutral, the government concedes that the program is subject to strict judicial scrutiny").
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I. THE CURRENT STATE OF SPENDING POWER LAW
The circuit split developed over laws promulgated under the
Spending Power. It is therefore helpful to examine the constitutional
basis and use of this power, particularly as it relates to the role of
states in implementing federal conditions in exchange for federal
funds. Under the Spending Power, states must be given the choice to
participate and to make the decision to enact the federally mandated
conditions as state law, even though Congress can accomplish its legis-
lative goals by using federal funds as incentives to encourage states to
adopt the federal regulations."
Congress typically legislates in one of two ways. First, Congress
may regulate directly by passing laws that the federal government en-
forces. Second, Congress may legislates indirectly, making recipients
implement prescribed conditions in exchange for federal funds.16 Con-
gress's constitutional authority for such indirect legislation is the Spend-
ing Power." The Spending Power is derived from Congress's Article I
power to "lay and collect Taxes ... to pay the Debts and provide for the
common Defence and general Welfare of the United States."'8 This
power implicitly provides Congress with a general grant of power to
spend.'9 Under this grant, Congress may "attach conditions on the re-
ceipt of federal funds."' In so doing, Congress provides the recipient a
choice: either accept the constitutionally required conditions or forego
federal funding.
A state's authority over its choice to accept federal funds and,
consequently, to adopt the federal regulations as a condition for such
funds, is critical to maintaining state sovereignty.' This choice allows
"elected state officials [to] regulate in accordance with the views of
the local electorate," even if the promise of funds influences a state's
15 See New York v United States, 505 US 144,168-69 (1992).
16 See, for example, Rumsfeld v Forum for Academic & Individual Rights, Inc, 547 US 47,
126 S Ct 1297, 1306 (2006). See also New York, 505 US at 188 (stating that the Constitution
"permits the Federal Government to hold out incentives to the States as a means of encouraging
them to adopt suggested regulatory schemes").
17 On the Spending Power, see generally David E. Engdahl, The Spending Power, 44 Duke
L J 1 (1994); Albert J. Rosenthal, Conditional Federal Spending and the Constitution, 39 Stan L
Rev 1103 (1987).
18 US Const Art I, § 8, cl 1.
19 South Dakota v Dole, 483 US 203,207 (1987), quoting United States v Butler, 297 US 1,
66 (1936) ("[T]he power of Congress to authorize expenditure of public monies for public pur-
poses is not limited by the direct grants of legislative power found in the Constitution.").
20 Dole, 483 US at 206.
21 New York, 505 US at 168-69 (explaining that Spending Power legislation is constitutional
because it does not usurp the legislative authority of state officials and so does not "insulate" the
federal lawmakers "from the electoral ramifications of their decision").
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decision.i If the federal government does not give states the choice to
participate and instead mandates state participation, the federal law is
unconstitutional for usurping state sovereignty. If a state chooses to
accept congressional conditions, it enacts the federal conditions as
state law and implements that law through state regulations.24 A state's
decision to adopt federal conditions as state law is "the prerogative of
the States not merely in theory but in fact.""
Several restrictions limit the Spending Power's regulatory scope.
Most importantly, congressional regulation under the Spending Power
must present the choice to states unambiguously. The choice must be
unambiguous so that "[s]tates [can] exercise their choice [to partici-
pate in the federal law] knowingly, cognizant of the consequences of
their participation. 26 Spending Power regulations might also be in-
validated if a court finds them coercive. The Supreme Court has noted
that "in some circumstances the financial inducement offered by Con-
gress might be so coercive as to pass the point at which pressure turns
into compulsion."'27 However, the Court has not found a program coer-
cive since 1936." The Court generally justifies its unwillingness to find
a spending program coercive by emphasizing that a recipient has the
right to refuse the conditions by refusing funds.2 In this sense, the
Court's analysis of a state's decision to accept federal funds is analo-
gous to a court's probing of an agreement under the common law of
contract, as opposed to modern contract law?0 The Court will presume
22 Idat 169.
23 Id at 188 ("The Federal Government may not compel the States to enact or administer a
federal regulatory program.").
24 See Dole, 483 US at 211-12. See also Western States Paving Co, Inc v Washington State
Department of Transportation, 407 F3d 983,983 (9th Cir 2005).
25 Dole, 483 US at 211-12.
26 Id at 207, quoting Pennhurst State School and Hospital v Halderman, 451 US 1, 17 (1981).
27 Dole, 483 US at 211 (internal quotation marks omitted).
z8 See Butler, 297 US at 71 (striking the federal spending provision of the Agricultural Adjust-
ment Act as a coercive attempt to interfere with state agricultural regulation).
29 See, for example, Dole, 483 US at 211 ("We cannot conclude, however, that a conditional
grant of federal money of this sort is unconstitutional simply by reason of its success in achieving
the congressional objective."); Grove City College v Bell, 465 US 555,565 n 13 (1984) (noting that
if the college found the condition objectionable, it was free to cease participating in the funding
and thus escape the condition).
30 See Pennhurst, 451 US at 17 ("[L]egislation enacted pursuant to the spending power is
much in the nature of a contract: in return for federal funds, the States agree to comply with
federally imposed conditions."); Engdahl, 44 Duke L J at 78 (cited in note 17) ("Certain implica-
tions of the contractual character of spending conditions already are well recognized."). For
examples of the differences between the common law of contract and the modern contract ap-
proach, compare Batsakis v Demotsis, 226 SW 2d 673, 674-75 (Tex Civ App 1949) (holding the
defendant liable for return performance when the defendant received $25 in foreign currency in
exchange for a promise to pay the plaintiff $2000), with Williams v Walker-Thomas Furniture Co,
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that a state acted in its best interest in accepting federal funds and the
attached conditions, and an overly enticing choice only demonstrates
this interest.' As Professor David Engdahl has stated:
Even though [powerful] pressure techniques ... have become
commonplace, and although a dependency on federal funds akin
to addiction may have developed, the standard response to
claims of spending power "coercion" still is [the same]: com-
plaints of coercion should not be heard because the recipient
could have employed the "simple expedient of not yielding."3
By contrast, the Court has struck down federal program where states
were given only a choice between two regulatory regime& The law un-
constitutionally made the states agents of the federal government."
Congress increasingly regulates on an indirect basis by requiring
states to adopt a particular regulatory scheme as a prerequisite for fed-
eral funds. Concomitantly, states find it difficult to refuse such funds.5
Nevertheless, states have the choice to enact the federal conditions as
state law, and the federal government cannot constitutionally require
states to regulate' This tension creates several problems leading to
the circuit split, as examined below.
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT: IS A STATE SUSCEPTIBLE
TO AN As-APPLIED CHALLENGE?
This Part examines the circuit split between courts that have con-
sidered whether states are susceptible to as-applied challenges when
implementing federal affirmative action laws as a condition for the
receipt of federal funds. The circuit courts agree that the federal laws
at issue are facially constitutional and do not violate the Fifth Amend-
350 F2d 445, 449-50 (DC Cir 1965) (applying the unconscionability doctrine to relieve the de-
fendant of her contractual obligations).
31 Consider Butler, 297 US at 81 (Stone dissenting) ("Threat of loss, not hope of gain, is the
essence of economic coercion.").
32 Engdahl, 44 Duke L J at 81 (cited in note 17) (internal citations omitted).
33 'See New York, 505 US at 175 (noting that when Congress provides only a choice be-
tween two different regulatory techniques, "Congress has crossed the line distinguishing encour-
agement from coercion").
34 Rosenthal, 39 Stan L Rev at 1103 (cited in note 17) ("The past five decades have seen
tremendous growth in both the dimensions and the objects of spending by the federal govern-
ment."). See also Engdahl, 44 Duke L J at 2 (cited in note 17) ("The pervasive influence of the
federal government in modern American life is attributable in significant part to Congress's
manipulation of federal funds.").
35 See Engdahl, 44 Duke L J at 81 (cited in note 17).
36 See New York, 505 US at 188 ("Whatever the outer limits of that sovereignty may be,
one thing is clear: The Federal Government may not compel the States to enact or administer a
federal regulatory program.").
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ment."7 They disagree, however, over whether a state is still subject to
an as-applied challenge under the Fourteenth Amendment when im-
plementing federal conditions.7 The Sixth and Seventh Circuits held
that a state is not susceptible to as-applied challenges in these situa-
tions for two reasons. First, they found that a state is an agent of the
federal government and thus not susceptible to challenge for Four-
teenth Amendment violations." Second, they held that Congress may
permit states to implement affirmative action programs as an exercise
of their power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. . By contrast,
the Eighth and Ninth Circuits held that as-applied challenges against
states for possible Fourteenth Amendment violations are available.
They found such challenges warranted by the "narrowly tailored"
prong of strict scrutiny review of Fourteenth Amendment challenges."
A. Circuit Courts Refusing to Allow As-Applied Challenges
against a State
As noted above, the Sixth and Seventh Circuits find a state's im-
plementation of a federal affirmative action law not open to an as-
applied challenge. The Seventh Circuit's decision in Milwaukee County
37 See note 8.
38 Compare Western States Paving Co v Washington State Department of Transportation,
407 F3d 983, 996 (9th Cir 2005) ("As a threshold matter, we must therefore determine whether
[the state of] Washington's [affirmative action] program is even susceptible to an as-applied
challenge."); Sherbrooke Turf Inc v Minnesota Department of Transportation, 345 F3d 964, 969
(8th Cir 2003) (allowing such challenges), with Tennessee Asphalt Co v Farris, 942 F2d 969, 975
(6th Cir 1991) (denying such challenges); Milwaukee County Pavers Association v Fiedler, 922
F2d 419,423 (7th Cir 1991) (same).
39 See Tennessee Asphalt, 942 F2d at 975 ("[Elvery aspect of participation in the federal
highway program is mandated by Congress. And ... a state's compliance with the mandates of a
federal scheme is nothing more than compliance with federal law."); Milwaukee Pavers, 922 F2d
at 423 ("Insofar as the state is merely complying with federal law it is acting as the agent of the
federal government and is no more subject to being enjoined on equal protection grounds than the
federal civil servants who drafted the regulations").
40 See id at 423-24 (observing that pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment, the federal
government may authorize states to take actions that would be impermissible without affirma-
tive authorization). See also Tennessee Asphalt, 942 F2d at 974.
41 See Western States, 407 F3d at 997 ("[lIt is necessary to undertake an as-applied inquiry
into whether Washington's DBE [Disadvantaged Business Enterprise] program is narrowly
tailored, and we therefore conclude that the district court erred when it upheld Washington's
DBE program simply because the State complied with the federal program's requirements.");
Sherbrooke Turf, 345 F3d at 973 (noting that "because the revised DBE program affords grantee
States substantial discretion," in order to find the program narrowly tailored it is necessary to
"examine the program as implemented by [the] States"). This Comment will only address
whether a state's application may be challenged, not what standard should apply to the state's
application of an affirmative action program if challenges are permissible. The Eighth and Ninth
Circuit are split on this question. Compare Western States, 407 F3d at 997-98 (stating that the
state must demonstrate past discrimination within the state), with Sherbrooke Turf, 345 F3d at
973-74 (examining whether the state followed appropriate federal regulations).
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Pavers Association v Fiedler2 illustrates this approach. 3 In Milwaukee
Pavers, highway contractors challenged the state of Wisconsin for its
implementation of a federal law that required states, as a condition for
federal funds, to ensure that "10 percent of the amounts appropriated
under the Act be expended with small business concerns owned and
controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals."
The Milwaukee Pavers court focused on the fact that the state
was applying a federal statute, noting "[t]he basic question raised by
the contractors' appeal is the proper characterization of the state's
role. 45 In addressing this question, the court distinguished between a
state-enacted law and a federally enacted law that a state applies. 4 In
the former case, the court reasoned, the state is the principal, while in
the latter, the state is an agent of the federal government.4' The Sev-
enth Circuit asserted that "[i]nsofar as the state is merely complying
with federal law it is acting as the agent of the federal government and
is no more subject to being enjoined on equal protection grounds than
the federal civil servants who drafted the regulations."" The court con-
tinued, "If the state does exactly what the statute expects it to do, and
the statute is conceded for the purposes of the litigation to be [fa-
cially] constitutional, we do not see how the state can be thought to
have violated the Constitution. ' '9 Under this reasoning, as the agent of
the federal government the state cannot violate the Constitution by
implementing a facially constitutional statute and hence is not suscep-
tible to Fourteenth Amendment challenges: °
The Milwaukee Pavers court recognized that the weakness of its
rationale was that a state can reject federal funds to avoid participa-
42 922 F2d 419 (7th Cir 1991).
43 Although the Ninth Circuit reasoned that Milwaukee Pavers did not deal with an as-
applied challenge, the Sixth Circuit found it did address such challenges and expressly adopted
the Seventh Circuit's approach. Compare Western States Paving, 407 F3d at 997 n 9 ("The [Sev-
enth Circuit] refused to consider whether discrimination had actually taken place in Wisconsin
because the contractors had conceded that the federal statute was constitutional both on its face
and as applied."), with Tennessee Asphalt, 942 F2d at 975 (citing Milwaukee Pavers with ap-
proval). See also Western States, 407 F3d at 1004 (McKay dissenting) ("Reading Milwaukee
County Pavers as not discussing an as-applied challenge focuses too much on the opinion's form
instead of on its substance."). Since the Sixth Circuit expressly adopted the Seventh Circuit's
reasoning, this Comment will focus upon the Seventh Circuit's approach.
44 Milwaukee Pavers, 922 at 422 (internal quotation marks omitted), examining the Surface
Transportation and Uniform Relocation Assistance Act of 1987.
45 922 F2d at 422.
46 See id at 421.
47 See id.
48 See id at 423.
49 See id. See also Tennessee Asphalt, 942 F2d at 975 ("[A] state's compliance with the
mandates of a federal scheme is nothing more than compliance with federal law.").
50 See Milwaukee Pavers, 922 F2d at 423.
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tion." Consequently, the court supported its analysis with an analogy.
The court stated that Congress may use its enforcement authority un-
der § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to allow states to apply federal
affirmative action laws-when the federal government is permitted to
do so-in a way similar to Congress's ability to permit states to regu-
late interstate commerce by lifting the negative command of the
Dormant Commerce Clause.5 2 Congress has plenary power over such
commerce and may use this authority to authorize states to regulate
interstate commerce otherwise barred.3
In Milwaukee Pavers, the Seventh Circuit asserted that Congress
enjoys similar authority under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
court argued that § 5 provides the federal government with a "freer
hand" to "engage in affirmative action" than the states." If Congress
can authorize states to regulate interstate commerce when otherwise
prohibited, "[w]hy then cannot Congress use its powers under section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to authorize states to engage in ac-
tivities that would otherwise violate section 1 of the amendment?"'"
Thus, the Milwaukee Pavers court reasoned that the federal gov-
ernment can delegate to states its constitutional authority to apply an
affirmative action law when the federal law is facially constitutional.
The court held that this grant of congressional authority, in conjunc-
tion with a state's role as an agent of the federal government, requires
that states be immune to as-applied challenges when applying federal
affirmative action laws.
51 See id ("It is true that the statute does not require the states to accept funds under it
and, by doing so, to become subject to the set-aside provision and the implementing regulations.
But it authorizes them to do so, and action pursuant to a valid authorization is valid.").
52 See id ("There is an analogy to the power of Congress to lift the bar of the 'dormant' or
,negative' commerce clause."). The Commerce Clause, by its own import and without any addi-
tional congressional action, forbids states from interfering in certain circumstances with inter-
state commerce, a prohibition known as the "Dormant Commerce Clause." See US Const Art I,
§ 8, cl 3. For a description of when the Dormant Commerce Clause applies, see Southern Pacific
Co v Sullivan, 325 US 761, 766-68 (1945) (reserving to the states the residual authority to enact
certain minimal regulations affecting interstate commerce "in the absence of conflicting legisla-
tion by Congress").
53 For Congress's power to lift the Dormant Commerce Clause, see Wilkerson v Rahrer,
140 US 545, 562-65 (1891) (deciding that states may enact commercial regulations when Con-
gress permits them to do so). See also United States v Darby, 312 US 100, 114 (1941) ("The power
of Congress over interstate commerce is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent,
and acknowledges no limitations other than are prescribed in the Constitution.") (internal quo-
tation marks omitted).
54 See Milwaukee Pavers, 922 F2d at 423-24 (reasoning that Congress is freer to engage in
affirmative action because § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment is a restriction on state power
while § 5 grants Congress positive authority).
55 Id at 424.
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B. Circuit Courts Permitting As-Applied Challenges
The Eighth and Ninth Circuits have adopted a contrary conclu-
sion, holding that a state's application of a federal statute conditioning
funds on the adoption of an affirmative action program is susceptible
to as-applied challenges.6 These courts held that such review is man-
dated by the dictates of the narrowly tailored prong of strict scrutiny
review. They reasoned that an affirmative action law is only narrowly
tailored if it is limited to geographical areas where it is "demonstrably
needed."" Hence, states must be susceptible to challenge to ensure
that the federal program is constitutionally permissible in each state
that implements the affirmative action 
laws.
The Ninth Circuit's holding in Western States Paving Co v Wash-
.59 ... 60
ington State Department of Transportation illustrates this reasoning.
The Ninth Circuit first found the federal law in question facially con-
stitutional.1 Turning to the as-applied challenge against the state of
Washington, the court stated that "as a threshold matter, we must
therefore determine whether [a state's application of a federal] pro-
gram is even susceptible to an as-applied challenge."'
The court answered this question in the affirmative, basing its
conclusion on the dictates of strict scrutiny review.6 3 Strict scrutiny
review is a merits-based review standard, applied by a court to deter-
mine whether a race-based affirmative action program meets the
mandates of the Equal Protection Clause.4 To pass strict scrutiny re-
56 See Western States, 407 F3d at 997; Sherbrooke Turf, 345 F3d at 973-74 (considering and
rejecting an as-applied challenge to state programs).
57 See Western States, 407 F3d at 996, quoting Sherbrooke Turf,.345 F3d at 971 ("[T]o be
narrowly tailored, a national program must be limited to those parts of the country where its
race-based measures are demonstrably needed.").
58 See Western States, 407 F3d at 996-97, quoting Sherbrooke Turf, 345 F3d at 971 ("To the
extent the federal government delegates this tailoring function, a State's implementation be-
comes critically relevant to a reviewing court's strict scrutiny.").
59 407 F3d 983 (9th Cir 2005).
60 Since the Ninth Circuit adopted the Eighth Circuit's approach to this issue, this case
reflects the reasoning of both circuits. See id at 997 ("We also agree with the Eighth Circuit that
it is necessary to undertake an as-applied inquiry.").
61 See id at 995 ("We are satisfied that TEA-21's DBE program is a narrowly tailored
means of remedying the effects of race- and sex-based discrimination within the transportation
contracting industry, and thus Western States' facial challenge must fail.").
62 Id at 996.
63 See id at 996-97, 999 (arguing that a statute cannot be rationally tailored without being
limited by state application). The United States also argued that a state should be susceptible to
an as-applied challenge. See id at 996 ("The United States, which intervened solely to defend
[the statute's] facial constitutionality, disagrees with Washington's effort to shelter its [imple-
menting] program from as-applied scrutiny.").
64 See Adarand Constructors, Inc v Pena, 515 US 200,227 (1995) ("[Wle hold today that all
racial classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local governmental actor, must be
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view, an affirmative action law must be narrowly tailored to achieve a
compelling state interest. '
The Western States court, however, examined the affirmative action
spending program under strict scrutiny review not to conduct a merits
review of whether the program was constitutionally permissible under
the Fourteenth Amendment, but to determine whether a Fourteenth
Amendment claim against the state was even justiciable. ' The court be-
gan by assessing the compelling interest prong, reasoning that review-
ing for compelling interest assesses a statute on its face.6 Under this
federal law, the court concluded, a facial challenge only requires chal-
lenging the federal government. Accordingly, the compelling state in-
terest prong did not require state susceptibility to as-applied challenges.-
The Ninth Circuit next asserted that the narrowly tailored prong
of strict scrutiny review requires state susceptibility to challenge.0 The
court reasoned that a federal affirmative action program is only nar-
rowly tailored if it is limited to states where it is demonstrably
needed." States implement these federal affirmative action laws. Ac-
cordingly, states must be susceptible to challenge to ensure that the
race-based program is demonstrably needed in that state.
Western States' reasoning resulted in a vigorous dissent, which ar-
gued for the Sixth and Seventh Circuits' solutions.72 Nevertheless, neither
side of the circuit split provides a satisfactory solution to this question.
III. CIRCUIT SPLIT ANALYSIS
This Part concludes that neither position properly accounts for a
state's susceptibility to challenge when applying a federal affirmative
action law. The Sixth and Seventh Circuits' two arguments-that the
analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny."). For a thorough discussion of strict scrutiny
review, see generally Grutter v Bollinger, 539 US 306 (2003).
65 Grutter, 539 US at 322.
66 See Western States, 407 F3d at 996-98 & n 9 (examining whether a state can defend the
constitutionality of its application of a federal statute merely by showing that it comports with
the statute). For a critique of the court's approach, see Part III.B.
67 See id at 997 ("we agree with the Eighth Circuit that Washington need not demonstrate
an independent compelling interest for its DBE program. When Congress enacted [the statute],
it identified a compelling nationwide interest in remedying discrimination in the transportation
contracting industry.").
68 See id at 996, quoting Sherbrooke Turf, 345 F3d at 970.
69 See Western States, 407 F3d at 996-97 ("Even if [the discrimination at issue] does not
exist in Washington, the State's implementation of TEA-21 nevertheless rests upon the compel-
ling nationwide interest identified by Congress.").
70 See id, citing Sherbrooke Turf, 345 F3d at 971 ("To the extent the federal government
delegates this tailoring function, a State's implementation becomes critically relevant to a re-
viewing court's strict scrutiny.").
71 See Western States, 307 F3d at 996, quoting Sherbrooke Turf, 345 F3d at 971.
72 See Western States, 307 F3d at 1003 (McKay dissenting).
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state is an agent of the federal government and that Congress can en-
able states to apply federal affirmative action laws under § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment -both fail. A state cannot constitutionally be
a congressional agent because the Constitution's federal system and
Spending Power mandate state sovereignty apart from the federal
government." Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment does not pro-
vide Congress with constitutional authority comparable to its power
over interstate commerce to allow states to freely implement federal
affirmative action laws." Likewise, the Eighth and Ninth Circuits' posi-
tion is unpersuasive because they misuse strict scrutiny review, using
the merits-based review standard to determine justiciability. Further-
more, even accepting their reasoning, it does not necessitate as-
applied challenges against states. An alternative analysis is required to
resolve this controversy.
A. The Sixth and Seventh Circuits: A Constitutionally
Flawed Position
Neither justification proffered by the Sixth and Seventh Circuits
satisfactorily immunizes a state from as-applied challenges. First, it
violates constitutional principles to find a state immune from chal-
lenge because it is an agent of the federal government." States cannot
become agents of the federal government but instead must maintain
their sovereignty.6 Moreover, Spending Power laws-such as affirma-
tive action statutes-are constitutional precisely because they do not
make a state an agent of the federal government." Furthermore, the
analogy between Congress's authority under § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment and the Dormant Commerce Clause cannot sustain the
Sixth and Seventh Circuit's conclusions. Congress's § 5 power is fun-
damentally different from its Dormant Commerce Clause authority.
Section 5 does not give Congress the authority to enable states to
freely implement federal affirmative action laws.
73 See New York v United States, 505 US 144,188 (1992), quoting Federalist 39 (Madison), in
The Federalist Papers 240,245 (New American Library 1961) (Clinton Rossiter, ed) (stating that the
Constitution reserves to states an "inviolable sovereignty" separate from the federal government).
74 See City of Boerne v Flores, 521 US 507,520-24 (1997) (noting that Congress does not
have plenary power under the Fourteenth Amendment as it does under the Commerce Clause).
75 See New York, 505 US at 188 ("States are not mere political subdivisions of the United
States. State governments are neither regional offices nor administrative agencies of the Federal
Government. The positions occupied by state officials appear nowhere on the Federal Govern-
ment's most detailed organizational chart.").
76 Id ("The Constitution instead leaves to the several States a residuary and inviolable
sovereignty reserved explicitly to the States by the Tenth Amendment.") (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted).
77 See id.
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1. A state cannot be the federal government's agent.
In Milwaukee Pavers, the Seventh Circuit declared that it did not
"see how the state can be thought to have violated the Constitution"
when it was not the progenitor of affirmative action laws.78 Instead, the
court concluded, a state was an agent of the federal government, "no
more subject to being enjoined on equal protection grounds than the
federal civil servants who drafted the regulations."79 Initially, this anal-
ogy to agency law appears sensible. Agency is a "fiduciary relation
which results from the manifestation of consent by one person to an-
other that the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his control,
and consent by the other so to act."" Here, the federal government
(principal) creates the program, inducing the state's (agent's) agree-
ment for monetary gain, with the state's implementation of the pro-
gram subject to some control.. Like a federal agency, states implement
and execute (with some discretion) the law promulgated by Con-
gress." The differences between general state law and the implement-
ing regulations may support the inference that a state enacting feder-
ally promulgated law becomes an agent of the federal government.
The Seventh Circuit's analogy also retains superficial appeal on
fairness grounds. States are so dependent on federal funds that a state
often has no choice but to accept the conditions Congress attaches to
the receipt of funds." It is perhaps equitable to treat states as agents of
Congress in implementing federal law.4
Nonetheless, this comparison to agency law fails because it is in-
consistent with the background presumption of the constitutional
principles of federalism. The Supreme Court is very reluctant to con-
sider a state an agent of the federal government. Concurrently, the
Court is concerned with the maintenance of state sovereignty. In fol-
lowing this background presumption, one should be reluctant to con-
sider a state an agent in this circumstance, leading to a rejection of the
78 Milwaukee Pavers, 922 F2d at 423.
79 Id.
80 Restatement (Second) of Agency § 1(1) (1958). Technically, the Seventh Circuit seems to
be arguing the state is a servant of the federal government, as opposed to an independent con-
tractor; both can be agents. See id at § 220. The Restatement notes, however, that "agent" is a
colloquial term for servant. See id at § 14N comment a. This Comment will thus adopt the con-
ventions of the Milwaukee Pavers court when using this term.
81 See id at § 1 comment a.
82 See Western States, 407 F3d at 989 ("The regulations do not establish a nationwide ...
program centrally administered by the [United States Department of Transportation]. Rather the
regulations delegate [the responsibility] to each State that accepts federal transportation funds.").
83 See text accompanying notes 34-35.
84 Consider Tennessee Asphalt Co v Farris, 942 F2d 969, 975 (6th Cir 1991) (noting, but
dismissing, the theoretical possibility that Tennessee could reject federal funds).
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Sixth and Seventh Circuit approach." In New York v United States,6
the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a federal law requiring
states to either (a) regulate waste sites according to Congressional
instructions, or (b) take title to those lands.87 The Court found this law
unconstitutional because it violated a state's implicit constitutional
sovereignty by turning a state into an agent of the federal govern-
ment." The Court repeatedly emphasized that states should not be
lightly considered agents of the federal government.9 Instead, the
Constitution's federal system requires that states have a "residuary
and inviolable sovereignty" separate from the federal government.
Although the Court's holding focused on the narrower rejection of
federal compulsion of state regulations, their thrust was clear. The
Court displayed a reluctance to consider states agents of the federal
government under a federal system where states are sovereign actors.
The Court seemed to suggest a background presumption that states
are sovereigns and should not lightly be considered agents of the fed-
eral government.9' The Sixth and Seventh Circuits' position is therefore
incompatible with constitutional principles and should be rejected.
More importantly, the Court in New York distinguished Spending
Power legislation from the unconstitutional law at issue. The Court
stated that "[t]he Constitution ... permits the Federal Government to
hold out incentives to the States as a means of encouraging them to
adopt suggested regulatory schemes."93 Spending Power legislation is
constitutionally acceptable, the Court stated, because a state chooses
to participate and enact the federal conditions, thereby maintaining
state sovereignty and preventing the state from becoming an agent of
the federal government." It is problematic to term the state an agent
85 The Sixth and Seventh Circuits' position is based on an analogy to the common law of
agency. Although further exploration of agency law, such as the doctrine of frolic and detour,
may help resolve this circuit split, it is beyond the scope of this Comment, which resolves the
issue at a constitutional level.
86 505 US 144 (1992).
87 Id at 153, invalidating the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Pblicy Amendments Act of 1985, Pub
L No 99-240,99 Stat 1842,1851, § 102(5)(d)(2)(C), codified at 42 USC § 2021(e)(d)(2)(C) (1986).
8 New York, 505 US at 188 ("The Federal Government may not compel the States to enact
or administer a federal regulatory program .... While there may be many constitutional methods
of achieving [Congress's policy goals in this area, such as by providing states with incentives], the
method Congress has chosen is not one of them.").
89 Id ("State[s] ... are [not] administrative agencies of the Federal Government .... The Federal
Government may not compel the States to enact or administer a federal regulatory program.").
90 Id, quoting Federalist 39 (Madison) at 256 (cited in note 73).
91 New York, 505 US at 188.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 See, for example, id at 168 (contrasting an unconstitutional federal compulsion of a state
with a conditional spending law because in the later, "the residents of the State retain the ulti-
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of the federal government in implementing a federal affirmative ac-
tion law when these laws are promulgated under the Spending
Power-which the Court explicitly affirms maintains state sovereignty
and does not make a state an agent of the federal government.9'
Moreover, it is logically inconsistent to find that agency law ab-
solves a state from constitutional challenge. Agency law identifies
agents to ensure that the principal is responsible for the agent's legal
wrongs.9 It does not absolve the agent from preexisting legal respon-
sibilities-here the Fourteenth Amendment's limitations.7
2. The weakness of the analogy with § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment; raising the bar of the
Dormant Commerce Clause.
The Sixth and Seventh Circuits' analogy between § 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment and Congress's authority to raise the bar of the
Dormant Commerce Clause is also an insufficient justification for
finding a state immune from as-applied challenges. The analogy fails
for two reasons. First, Congress's latitude to enact affirmative action
statutes is no wider than that of the states.9 Second, Congress's § 5
power is not so broad, in contrast to its Commerce Clause authority, as
to enable states to employ an otherwise unconstitutional affirmative
action statute.9
mate decision as to whether or not the State will comply"); South Dakota v Dole, 483 US 206,
211-12 (1987) (holding a Spending Power law constitutional because "[h]ere Congress has of-
fered relatively mild encouragement to the States .... But the enactment of such laws remains the
prerogative of the States not merely in theory but in fact."). For further discussion, see Part IV.D.
95 See New York, 505 US at 168 (commenting on the differences between Spending Law
enactments and federally compelled state legislation).
96 See Restatement (Second) of Agency at § 215 (cited in note 80) ("A master or other
principal who unintentionally authorizes conduct of a servant or other agent which constitutes a
tort to a third person is subject to liability to such person.").
97 Id at § 343 ("An agent who does an act otherwise a tort is not relieved from liability by
the fact that he acted at the command of the principal or on account of the principal.") Conced-
edly, an agent is not liable under contract law for acting under the command of the principal. The
theory, however, is that the agent is not a party to the contract and thus has no legal duty in
entering the contract. Id at § 320. Here, in contrast, the state's position is more naturally com-
pared to tort law, where the state has a preexisting legal responsibility and entering into the
agency relationship does not absolve this responsibility.
98 See Adarand Constructors, Inc v Pena, 515 US 200, 227 (1995) (reviewing all affirmative
action laws, by whatever level of government, under the same standard).
99 Compare City of Boerne, 521 US at 519 (holding that Congress cannot use its § 5 authority
to make constitutional acts that would otherwise violate the Fourteenth Amendment), with
Wilkerson v Rahrer, 140 US 545, 560-62 (1891) (holding that Congress can authorize otherwise
unconstitutional state interferences with interstate commerce, owing to its plenary power over
interstate commerce).
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Admittedly, § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment sometimes gives
Congress positive authority.' ° For instance, Congress is normally for-
bidden from abrogating state sovereign immunity but may do so if
legislating pursuant to § 5.'0' Congress could conceivably enjoy similar
power here.
Nonetheless, the analogy drawn by the Sixth and Seventh Circuits
is inadequate. Contrary to the courts' holding, the federal government
does not have more constitutional latitude than states to enact af-
firmative action laws. In Adarand Constructors, Inc v Pena,'1 the Su-
preme Court held that any affirmative action program will be re-
viewed under the same strict-scrutiny standard regardless of the en-
acting level of government. Congress does not possess wider author-
ity than states when adopting affirmative action laws, and so lacks the
authority to immunize states from constitutional challenges.
'1°
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has held that Congress cannot
simply enforce its own interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment
and use § 5 to legislate pursuant to its own interpretation."" Thus, even
if Congress did enjoy wider authority than states to implement af-
firmative action programs, Congress cannot make an otherwise un-
constitutional state affirmative action program constitutional through
the use of its § 5 power.
By comparison, Congress may allow states to regulate interstate
commerce when states are otherwise constitutionally prohibited from
doing so °'i Congress simply does not possess authority over the Four-
teenth Amendment as it does over interstate commerce, destroying this
100 See Seminole Tribe of Florida v Florida, 517 US 44,59 (1996).
101 Id (noting that the Court had previously "recognized that the Fourteenth Amendment,
by expanding federal power at the expense of state autonomy, had fundamentally altered the
balance of state and federal power struck by the Constitution").
102 515 US 200 (1995).
103 Id at 227 ("[Wle hold today that all racial classifications, imposed by whatever federal,
state, or local governmental actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny. In
other words, such classifications are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored measures
that further compelling governmental interests.").
104 See id.
105 See City of Boerne, 521 US at 519 ("Congress' power under § 5 ... extends only to [the
enforcement of] the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment .... The design of the Amendment
and the text of § 5 are inconsistent with the suggestion that Congress has the power to decree the
substance of the Fourteenth Amendment's restrictions on the States."). See also Robert C. Post,
The Supreme Court 2002 Term: Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts; and
Law, 117 Harv L Rev 4, 12-29 (2003) (noting that recent Supreme Court jurisprudence suggests
that Congress can only use § 5 to enforce the rights the judiciary would protect pursuant to § 1,
but cannot use § 5 to enforce Congress's own interpretation of § 1).
106 See Wilkerson, 140 US at 560-62. Strikingly, Congress rejected a draft of the Fourteenth
Amendment that would have given Congress plenary power over the Fourteenth Amendment,
further illustrating the weakness of this analogy. See City of Boerne, 521 US at 520-24 (detailing
Congress's rejection of this proposed draft).
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analogy. Thus, because this justification, like the justification from agency
law, is an insufficient basis for immunizing a state from Constitutional
challenge, the Sixth and Seventh Circuits' reasoning should be rejected.
B. The Eighth and Ninth Circuits: Why Affirmative Action
Precedent Cannot Solve the Circuit Split
This section argues that the Eighth and Ninth Circuits' reasoning
is insufficient despite reaching the correct conclusion. These circuits
correctly recognized that a two-part test is necessary for determining
whether a state violated the Fourteenth Amendment by enforcing an
affirmative action law. The Eighth and Ninth Circuits conflate these two
steps, using strict scrutiny review, a merits-based determination, to de-
termine the jurisdictional question of whether a state is even susceptible
to suit under the Fourteenth Amendment.o Furthermore, the Eighth
and Ninth Circuits' reasoning does not require a state's susceptibility to
challenge. The Eighth and Ninth Circuits' position is driven by the be-
lief that subjecting a state to challenge is essential in determining
whether a federal law is narrowly tailored or, in other words, "demon-
strably needed" in that state. ' However, even assuming that strict scru-
tiny requires that an affirmative action law is "demonstrably needed" in
that state, it does not require a state's susceptibility to challenge.
The Eighth and Ninth Circuits correctly noted that a two-part
analysis exists to determine whether a state violated the Fourteenth
Amendment by enforcing an affirmative action law. First, one must
determine if the state is limited under the Fourteenth Amendment
and susceptible to challenge for potential violations of that Amend-
ment.'° Second, a court applies strict scrutiny review to determine
whether the state's application is constitutionally acceptable if it is
decided that a state is open to challenge."° For example, in Grutter v
Bollinger,"' the Supreme Court applied strict scrutiny in determining
that the University of Michigan Law School's affirmative action pro-
gram was constitutional -but only after it found the school was re-
sponsible for meeting the Fourteenth Amendment's limitations. '
The Eighth and Ninth Circuits incorrectly conflate the two-step
analysis by holding that strict scrutiny review requires a state's suscep-
107 See Western States, 407 F3d at 996, quoting Sherbrooke Turf Inc v Minnesota Department
of Transportation, 345 F3d 964,971 (8th Cir 2003).
108 Western States, 407 F3d at 996, quoting Sherbrooke Turf, 345 F3d at 971.
109 See Western States, 407 F3d at 996.
110 Id.
111 539 US 306 (2003).
112 Id at 326.
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tibility to challenge."3 Strict scrutiny review is a judicial tool to deter-
mine whether a governmental program complies with the Fourteenth
Amendment once it is accepted that the state is susceptible to chal-
lenge. Strict scrutiny does not determine the antecedent jurisdictional
question of whether a state is subject to the Fourteenth Amendment.
If, as the Sixth and Seventh Circuits hold, a state is not subject to the
Equal Protection Clause when applying federal law, there are no con-
stitutional limitations to violate and hence no need for strict scrutiny
review."' Instead, a court must first determine whether a state is sub-
ject to challenge for violations of the Fourteenth Amendment before
applying strict scrutiny review.15
Conceivably, the Eighth and Ninth Circuits' "strict-scrutiny re-
quired" holding can be understood as an attempt to determine the
affirmative action law's constitutionality. That is, their background
reasoning is that an affirmative action law is only constitutional in
areas where it "is demonstrably needed. '"6 With this in mind, they hold
that a state must be available to challenge to determine whether the
federal law is narrowly tailored because states are applying these laws.1
7
Even accepting the premise that strict scrutiny requires that an
affirmative action law is demonstrably needed in that state, this prem-
ise does not require a state's susceptibility to challenge. The courts
reasoned that affirmative action laws are only narrowly tailored in
states where affirmative action is necessary. Since states are applying
these laws, they should be subject to as-applied challenges to deter-
mine their constitutionality."8 In essence, these circuits are stating that
these federal laws are only narrowly tailored if implemented in areas
where affirmative action is needed. The Eighth and Ninth Circuits'
concerns are better addressed by asking'whether the federal laws are
narrowly tailored by being limited in scope to areas where affirmative
action is "demonstrably needed" and finding these laws constitutional
only if the federal law is limited to states where affirmative action is
required. Thus, the Eighth and Ninth Circuits' "strict scrutiny re-
113 See Western States, 407 F3d at 997-98.
114 See Milwaukee Pavers, 922 F2d at 423.
115 Affirmative action precedent is unhelpful in resolving this issue because it typically
assumes state susceptibility to challenge. See, for example, Grutter, 539 US at 326-46; Adarand,
515 US at 227.
116 Sherbrooke Turf, 345 F3d at 970-71.
117 See id (noting that review of the specific implementation is essential to determining
whether the program in question is narrowly tailored).
118 Western States, 407 F3d at 997-98 (describing how local circumstances determine
whether a given state program is narrowly tailored); Sherbrooke Turf, 345 F3d at 970-71 (con-
cluding that when the federal government "delegates" its narrow tailoring responsibility to the
states, a state's implementation must be subject to strict scrutiny).
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quired" analysis actually does not require a state's availability to chal-
lenge. These circuits' position should therefore be rejected. The ques-
tion of whether a state is available to challenge when applying a fed-
eral affirmative action law should be decided using the constitutional
role of a state when applying federal law, not the constitutional status
of the federal law being implemented.
IV. RESOLVING THE CIRCUIT SPLIT:
WHY A STATE MUST BE SUSCEPTIBLE TO CHALLENGE
This Part argues that a state's role in applying federal affirmative
action laws provides four reasons why a state should be susceptible to
an as-applied constitutional challenge. First, members of the Supreme
Court have implied that the Court is amenable to as-applied chal-
lenges in such situations."9 Second, the Fourteenth Amendment makes
a state's enforcement of a law sufficient to trigger constitutional limi-
tations and hence open that state to challenge. Third, barring as-
applied challenges would lead to absurd consequences: if states are
unavailable for as-applied challenges, facially constitutional laws may
be applied unconstitutionally, leaving citizens without a remedy to vin-
dicate their constitutional rights. ° Fourth, Spending Power laws main-
tain a state's sovereign independence, ' so a state should remain re-
sponsible for meeting the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment.
A. The Supreme Court's Openness to As-Applied Challenges
Although it has yet to address the issue directly, the Supreme
Court has implied that as-applied challenges against states are avail-
able.'= The Milwaukee Pavers court actually observed the Supreme
Court's openness to this position,'2 stating that in Fullilove v Klutznick'2v
the Supreme Court held a federal Spending Power law constitutional
on its face, "but left open the possibility that it might be condemned
later because of the way in which it was administered in fact."''
119 See, for example, United States v American Library Association, Inc, 539 US 194, 215
(2003) (Kennedy concurring).
120 For example, if we assume that the Western States court is correct in asserting that fed-
eral affirmative action law can only be applied where there exist past examples of race-based
discrimination, see Western States, 407 F3d at 996-97, then surely there would be situations where
the law would be facially constitutional but nonetheless applied unconstitutionally.
121 See, for example, New York, 505 US at 167-68 (noting that a Spending Power law is
constitutional because it maintains a state's sovereign independence in the federal system).
122 See, for example, American Library Association, 539 US at 215 (Kennedy concurring).
123 Milwaukee Pavers, 922 F2d at 423.
124 448 US 448 (1980).
125 See Milwaukee Pavers, 922 F2d at 423 (emphasis added). Surprisingly, given this obser-
vation, the Seventh Circuit did not find the state susceptible to an as-applied challenge.
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Justices Kennedy and Breyer alluded to the potential availability
of as-applied challenges against states in United States v American
Library Association, Inc. 1 6 This case involved a facial challenge to a
spending program on the grounds that it required state libraries to
violate the First Amendment.'" Chief Justice Rehnquist's plurality
opinion, in which Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas joined, up-
held the program against facial challenge.' In their concurring opin-
ions, critical since they were necessary to form a majority, Justices
Kennedy and Breyer indicated the possibility of as-applied challenges
against states. As Justice Kennedy stated:
If some [public] libraries do not have the capacity to unblock
specific Web sites or to disable the filter or if it is shown that an
adult user's election to view constitutionally protected Internet
material is burdened in some other substantial way, that would be
subject for an as-applied challenge, not the facial challenge made
in this case.19
Moreover, it has been asserted by at least one commentator that
after American Library Association, as-applied challenges are avail-
able against states."O These statements support the proposition that a
state is susceptible to challenge when applying a law created under the
Spending Power. Here, states are applying a law passed under this
constitutional authority."' Consequently, Kennedy and Breyer's sug-
gestions should be followed and states should be susceptible to as-
applied challenges when applying these affirmative action laws.
B. Textual Guidance from the Fourteenth Amendment:
A State Remains Subject to the Fourteenth Amendment
When "Enforcing" a Law
The text of the Fourteenth Amendment supports the argument that
a state is susceptible to an as-applied challenge when implementing a
federal affirmative action law. The Fourteenth Amendment's text makes
126 539 US 194 (2003).
127 See American Library Association, 539 US at 220 (Breyer concurring).
128 See id at 214 (plurality) (concluding that the law in question was a valid use of the con-
stitutional Spending Power, did not "induce libraries to violate the Constitution," and did not
"impose an unconstitutional condition on public libraries").
129 See id at 215 (Kennedy concurring) (noting that if some libraries were unable to apply
the law constitutionally this would be grounds for an as-applied challenge) (emphasis added).
130 See Barbara A. Sanchez, Note, United States v. American Library Association The
Choice between Cash and Constitutional Rights, 38 Akron L Rev 463,499 (2005) (observing that
the decision "open[s] the door to the 'as-applied' challenges foreseen by Justice Kennedy").
131 See Western States, 407 F3d at 988-89 (noting that here Congress required states to
implement federal conditions in exchange for federal funds).
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a state subject to its limitations whenever it "make(s) or enforce(s)" a
law. ' A state's implementation of federal law seemingly activates the
"enforce" clause, triggering a state's susceptibility to challenge.
A textualist reading of the Fourteenth Amendment lends cre-
dence to the conclusion that a state is subject to constitutional scrutiny
when implementing federal affirmative action laws. The Amendment
states, "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; ... nor ... deny
to any person within its jurisdiction . . .the equal protection of the
laws. 13. The Fourteenth Amendment seemingly announces on its face
when a state is subject to that Amendment's limitations: when it en-
forces a law. Webster's Dictionary defines "enforce" as to "cause to take
effect."'' M Here, states clearly enforce these regulations, mandating com-
pliance on highway projects using federal funds. This state action should
be sufficient to trigger the Fourteenth Amendment's limitations.
Moreover, "enforce" is coequal with "make."135 Hence, a state
should be susceptible to challenge for enforcing a law in situations
where it would be open to objection for making such a law. A state is
liable to a constitutional suit when it creates an affirmative action law
and should thus be susceptible to remonstration for enforcing an af-
firmative action law. ' Thus, the "enforcement" clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment supports the position that a state should be liable
to an as-applied challenge when implementing a federal spending
power affirmative action law.
C. The Absurd Consequences of Refusing As-Applied Challenges
This Comment's position is further supported by a consequential-
ist argument.' 7 States applying affirmative action laws are the only
government entities susceptible to as-applied challenges in these
cases.13' Because states might apply a facially constitutional law in an
unconstitutional manner, as-applied challenges are necessary to en-
sure that states do not infringe individuals' Fourteenth Amendment
rights without possibility of redress.
132 US Const Amend XIV, § 1.
133 Id.
134 Webster's Third New International Dictionary 751 (Merriam-Webster 1993).
135 See US Const Amend XIV, § 1.
136 Consider Grutter, 539 US at 343.
137 See Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989
Duke L J 511, 515 (noting one of the most frequent reasons a court chooses a particular con-
struction is that the alternative "would produce 'absurd' results").
138 See Western States, 407 F3d at 990-91 (stating that a facial challenge to these laws must
go against the federal government, but an as-applied challenge must be brought against individ-
ual states).
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Justice Kennedy's statement in American Library Association,
noted above, underscores a basic recognition that facial challenges
against Spending Power laws are alone an insufficient protector of
Constitutional rights.'9 Upholding the federal statute against facial
challenge only means that the statute can potentially be applied con-
stitutionally. It does not mean that the statute will always be applied
constitutionally. Therefore, if a state's application of federal affirma-
tive action laws is not susceptible to challenge, then no as-applied
challenge will exist against these laws, creating circumstances where
states may apply such statutes unconstitutionally without redress or
judicial check. To give states unfettered discretion to implement af-
firmative action laws creates the potential for the serious infringement
on individuals' Fourteenth Amendment rights. As-applied challenges
are therefore essential to protect constitutional rights under Spending
Power legislation such as the laws at issue.
D. Why a State's Role under the Spending Power Requires
Its Susceptibility to As-Applied Challenges
A state's role as an independent actor under Spending Power
laws further supports making states susceptible to as-applied chal-
lenges. A conditional spending law is permissible for the reason that
states maintain their constitutionally required sovereignty through their
choice to either enact the federal conditions or refuse federal funds.' A
state should remain responsible under the Fourteenth Amendment for
its decision to apply federal law and hence be susceptible to challenge
since it retains its sovereignty under Spending Power legislation.
Recall that in New York v United States the Supreme Court held
unconstitutional a congressional act requiring states to regulate ac-
cording to constitutional desires because it usurped state sovereignty
and turned a state into the federal government's agent."' The Court
explicitly distinguished Spending Power laws from these unconstitu-
tional mandates, stating that the Spending Power maintains the state
sovereignty required by "our federal system.'" 2 The Court noted that a
state's constitutional role is appropriately maintained under Spending
Power legislation through a state's choice to participate in the federal
law.'" This is so because "the residents of the State retain the ultimate
decision as to whether the State will comply."'" State independence is
139 See Part IVA.
140 See New York, 505 US at 168-69.
141 See id. For further discussion, see Part III.A.1.
142 See New York, 505 US at 188.
143 See id at 188.
144 Id at 168. See also text accompanying notes 21-31.
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preserved because the state legislature ultimately determines whether
it is in the state's best interest to adopt the federal conditions or reject
funding."' This maintenance of sovereignty is why it is so important
that the states be given the clear, unambiguous choice to participate. A
state formally enacts the federal conditions as state law, even if the
"conditions attached to the funds by Congress may influence a State's
legislative choices.'' .6 Accordingly, the Supreme Court has consistently
rejected states' protests and arguments that they were coerced into in-
volvement when the states independently chose to enact the federal
conditions.' Congress's ability to require a state to apply regulations in
exchange for federal funds is constitutional precisely because it main-
tains state sovereignty."
It follows that states, as sovereign actors, should remain responsi-
ble for meeting the limitations on state action in the Fourteenth
Amendment and be susceptible to challenge for failing to do so. It is
counterintuitive to assert that a state decides to enact and apply the
federal affirmative action law, but that once it chooses to participate it is
no longer subject to Fourteenth Amendment restrictions on state ac-
tion. A state, by choosing to implement the federal conditions, should
participate cognizant of the constitutional limitations on state action
since states enjoy the sovereignty to refuse participation. "9
One may argue this distinction is formalistic. Since states are
highly dependent on federal funds, they have no choice but to accept
Congress's conditions, creating an illusory sovereignty."' However, this
very formalism is crucial for maintaining the federalism required by
the Constitution. A state's choice to participate allows the state to
145 New York, 505 US at 168 ("Where Congress encourages state regulation rather than
compelling it, state governments remain responsive to the local electorate's preferences; state
officials remain accountable to the people.").
146 Id at 167. See also Dole, 483 US at 211-12 ("[T]he enactment of [Spending Power] laws
remains the prerogative of the States not merely in theory but in fact.").
147 See text accompanying notes 27-32.
148 See New York, 505 US at 168-69, 188 (holding Congress's use of the Spending Power is
constitutional because, by providing a state the formal choice to participate, it maintains a state's
sovereignty); Dole, 483 US at 211-12 (stating that states enact the federal law "not merely in
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149 See Grove City College v Bell, 465 US 555, 565 n 13 (1984) (noting that if the recipient
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150 See Engdahl, 44 Duke L J at 78-86 (cited in note 17) (noting that the Supreme Court
repeatedly finds that as long as states have the choice they can remain independent of the fed-
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adopt federal conditions in the same manner it would enact regula-
tions; a state makes the decision to adopt the conditions as state law
and then enforces those conditions. This allows a state to undergo the
same sovereign processes that maintain the state autonomy constitu-
tionally required by our federal system. If a state is given the choice to
participate, the Constitution considers a state a sovereign entity re-
gardless of how frequently a state chooses to enact the federal condi-
tions. A state, as a constitutionally sovereign entity, should be subject
to constitutional limitations including the Fourteenth Amendment.
In sum, the Spending Power establishes a participating state as a
state actor. As such, the state should remain subject to the Fourteenth
Amendment and be susceptible to challenges for potential violations
of that Amendment.
CONCLUSION
Though the circuit split ostensibly deals with affirmative action, it
really involves underlying questions of federalism. Courts must con-
sider a state's position when applying these federal affirmative action
laws if they wish to answer these questions. A state's role suggests al-
lowing as-applied challenges against state application of federal af-
firmative action spending programs. In fact, this answer sweeps more
broadly, suggesting that states are susceptible to challenge whenever
they apply a federal law under Spending Power legislation. Beyond
the Supreme Court's openness to such challenges, the Spending
Power's animating force is that a state remains an independent sover-
eign in choosing to adopt the federal conditions and, accordingly,
should remain subject to the Fourteenth Amendment and susceptible
to challenge. Furthermore, a state's activity in applying such regula-
tions activates that Amendment's limitations, requiring a state's avail-
ability to suit. Finally, absolving states from challenge would create an
untenable situation where no as-applied objection existed. Accord-
ingly, individual states' application of congressional statutes making
the receipt of federal funds conditioned upon the adoption of a fed-
eral affirmative action program must be susceptible to an as-applied
challenge.
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